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Taft v. Bowers : The Foundation for
Non-Recognition Provisions in the Income Tax
James R. Repetti*
Taft v. Bowers1 is a Supreme Court decision that is rarely studied in
law schools or discussed by scholars. Yet, it is a case of vast significance.
In the Taft decision, the Supreme Court confirmed that Congress may
create non-recognition exceptions to the income tax that merely defer
the recognition of income, rather than permanently exclude it. If the
Taft case had been decided differently, it is likely that the number of
non-recognition provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”)
would be significantly reduced.
Taft v. Bowers involved the constitutionality of the carryover basis
rule for gifts. Prior to 1921, a donee’s tax basis in a gift was equal to the
fair market value of the gift at the time of the transfer.2 This meant that
taxpayers could permanently avoid recognizing gain in appreciated
property by making a gift of that property to a spouse, for example, and
then having the spouse sell the gifted property.3 Since the gift would
have a basis in the hands of the spouse equal to the fair market value of
the item at the time of the transfer, all appreciation that had accrued
prior to the gift would escape taxation.
Congress moved to end this abuse in 1921 by adopting the carryover basis rule.4 In holding that the carryover basis rule was constitutional, the Court in Taft created a path for Congress to allow many
forms of transfers, such as gifts, like-kind exchanges and exchanges of
stock in corporate mergers and acquisitions to be tax-free without bankrupting the Treasury. With a carryover basis, the appreciation in the
transferred asset would not escape taxation forever. Instead, the appreciation could be taxed in a subsequent transfer, unless the taxpayer held
the property until death.
* William J. Kenealy, S.J. Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author thanks Bryan Judd for helpful research assistance.
1 278 U.S. 470 (1929).
2 ROSWELL MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 358 (1936); see, e.g., Treas. Reg. 45, Art.
1562 (1918).
3 MAGILL, supra note 2, at 358.
4 Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, § 202(a), 42 Stat. 227, 229
(1921); H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 9 (1921); S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 10 (1921).
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The taxpayer in Taft was Elizabeth Clark Taft. Before exploring
the courts’ treatment of Elizabeth’s argument, it is interesting to note
Elizabeth’s impressive connections to the legal profession.5 Her husband, Walbridge S. Taft, was the nephew of William Taft, who had
served as the President of the United States and was the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court at the time the case was litigated.6 Elizabeth’s father-in-law was Henry W. Taft, who became the “Taft” in Cadwalader,
Wickersham and Taft.7 Henry represented Elizabeth in the litigation.8
Elizabeth’s father transferred stock to her as a gift when that
stock’s value was greater than the amount he had paid for it. Elizabeth
sold it for an even greater value and sought to calculate her gain using as
her basis the stock’s value at the time of her father’s gift, so that only the
appreciation that had occurred after the gift would be taxed. When the
I.R.S. sought to use her father’s lower basis in the stock to determine
her gain, Elizabeth argued that taxing her on appreciation that had occurred while her father held the stock violated the 16th Amendment
because it was not her income. The 16th Amendment allows Congress
“to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to
any census or enumeration.”9
The District Court, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court pursued significantly different tacks to resolve this issue.
The District Court concluded in a very brief opinion without citing any
case law that gifts cannot constitute income within the meaning of the
16th Amendment, but are instead similar to nontaxable contributions to
capital.10 As a result, the District Court concluded that the donee’s basis must equal the fair market value of the gift when she received it.11 If
the donee’s basis were not equal to the gift’s value, the donee would in
effect be taxed on the value of the gift when she sold it. The lack of
authority in the District Court’s opinion was attributable to the fact that
the status of gifts as income under the 16th Amendment had never been

5 Gift Stock Tax Suit Lost by Mrs. Taft, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1927, at 39; see Elizabeth Clark Bride of Walbridge S. Taft, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1923, at 7.
6 Elizabeth Clark Bride of Walbridge S. Taft, supra note 5; Supreme Court Rules
Profit on Gifts Taxable, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Feb. 19, 1929, at 2.
7 Thomas R. Violante, Noted New York Law Firm Donates Historical Records,
YALE BULLETIN & CALENDAR (Sept. 29, 2000), http://archives.news.yale.edu/v29.n4/
story5.html.
8 Gift Stock Tax Suit Lost by Mrs. Taft, supra note 5.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
10 Taft v. Bowers, 15 F.2d 890 (S.D. N.Y. 1926).
11 Id. at 890-91.
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litigated. The predecessors to the Code had excluded gifts from income
since the inception of the income tax in 1913.12
The District Court’s decision that gifts were not income under the
16th Amendment was consistent with the restricted definition of income
then utilized by the Supreme Court. Earlier, in 1920, the Court in Eisner v. Macomber13 had narrowly defined income as payments received
by a taxpayer for services or the use or sale of her capital. Another
Supreme Court decision, Edwards v. Cuba R. Co.,14 had determined in
1925 that payments received by a corporation from the Cuban government to subsidize construction of a railroad in Cuba were not income
under the 16th Amendment because the payments “were not made for
services rendered or to be rendered”15 and “were not profits or gains
from the use or operation of [the taxpayer’s capital, i.e.,] the railroad
. . . .”16 Instead, the Court characterized the payments as non-taxable
contributions to capital. Similar reasoning might have excluded gifts to
individuals from income for purposes of the 16th Amendment since the
receipt of a gift would not be for services or the use or sale of capital.17
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District
Court in a decision that involved three separate opinions by the threemember panel.18 Chief Judge Manton wrote that taxing Elizabeth on all
appreciation that had accrued from the date that her father had acquired the stock did not violate the 5th or 16th Amendments.19 He reasoned that Congress had a valid purpose, minimizing tax avoidance by
imposing a carryover basis, and that the Elizabeth had full knowledge
that the carryover basis would apply.20 In addition, he observed that the
amount of income that was taxed was not any greater than the amount
that would have been taxed had Elizabeth’s father sold the stock.21
Judge Hand concurred in a separate opinion. He said that the 16th
Amendment was not violated because the gain taxed clearly represented
12

MAGILL, supra note 2, at 357.
252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
14 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
15 Id. at 633.
16 Id.
17 For excellent discussions of the evolution of the definition of income, see
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What’s Law Got To Do
With It?, 39 SW. L.J. 869 (1985); Majorie E. Korhnauser, The Constitutional Meaning of
Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1992). Professor Kornhauser notes that there is some evidence that the term “income” as used in the 16th
Amendment was not intended to include gifts, although the matter is far from clear.
18 Bowers v. Taft, 20 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir. 1927).
19 Id. at 563.
20 Id. at 562-63.
21 Id. at 563.
13
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appreciation that had occurred after the donor purchased the stock.22
He further reasoned that the 16th Amendment did not require that income subject to tax be the income of the actual taxpayer, stating that
“[t]he language of the Amendment itself gives Congress power to lay
‘taxes on incomes,’ not on persons.”23
Judge Swan dissented, citing Edwards v. Cuba R. Co.24 He argued
that property “obtained by gift is capital, not income in the hands of the
donee upon its receipt.”25 He concluded that taxing gain that had accrued while Elizabeth’s father had held the stock was the same as taxing
a portion of the capital that Elizabeth had received as a gift.26
The Supreme Court (with Chief Justice Taft recusing himself) unanimously affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.27 The
Court noted that without a carryover basis, the appreciation that had
occurred prior to the gift would forever escape taxation.28 Moreover,
the Court determined, the imposition of a tax on the taxpayer did not
impose a hardship.29 The Court stated:
In truth the stock represented only a single investment of capital — that made by the donor. And when through sale or conversion the increase was separated therefrom, it became
income from that investment in the hands of the recipient . . .
according to the very words of the Sixteenth Amendment. By
requiring the recipient of the entire increase to pay a part into
the public treasury, Congress deprived her of no right and subjected her to no hardship. She accepted the gift with knowledge of the statute and, as to the property received, voluntarily
assumed the position of her donor. When she sold the stock
she actually got the original sum invested, plus the entire appreciation . . . .30
Adopting the reasoning of Judge Hand in the Court of Appeals decision, the Court succinctly concluded:
There is nothing in the Constitution which lends support to the
theory that gain actually resulting from the increased value of
capital can be treated as taxable income in the hands of the
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id.
Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 484 (1929).
Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 482.
Id.
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recipient only so far as the increase occurred while he owned
the property.31
The significance of the holding in Taft cannot be overstated. By
holding that gain taxed to the taxpayer need not be the gain that had
accrued while the taxpayer held the asset, the Court confirmed that nonrecognition provisions may defer the recognition of income. The result
is that gain avoided by a transferee in such non-recognition transactions
as corporate reorganizations, like-kind exchanges and gifts, may be
taxed at a future date when the transferee disposes of the property in a
taxable transaction.
The case is also important because it represents an important step
in the Court’s evolution towards an expansive definition of income.
Early Court decisions suggested a narrow approach to the definition of
income with only amounts received by the taxpayer for her services or
the use or sale of her capital qualifying as income. By holding that taxable gains need not have accrued while the current taxpayer held the
property, the Court started to shift focus away from the taxpayer’s activity in generating income to whether the taxpayer had simply experienced an accession to wealth. This movement to a broad concept of
income stands in stark contrast to the narrow approach the Court pursued in defining the tax base of the estate tax. Early Supreme Court
decisions on the estate tax, such as Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co.,32 established that the estate tax base, the “gross estate” as defined
in section 2033 of the Code, was to be defined narrowly. The result is
that in the estate tax, Congress was subsequently always playing “catch
up,” expanding the scope of the gross estate by adopting or amending
sections 2034 to 2044 of the Code to deal with new estate planning
abuses.33 In contrast, there has been little need to expand the concept
of income in the income tax and, indeed, sections 71 to 138 of the Code
generally limit the expansiveness of income as interpreted by the courts.

31

Id. at 484.
316 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1942).
33 PAUL R. MCDANIEL, JAMES R. REPETTI & PAUL L. CARON, FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAXATION 108 (7th ed. 2015).
32

